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LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 2010:
GOVERNMENT SPEECH:
THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO
COMPEL AND RESTRICT SPEECH

lNTRODUCTIOl'J:
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
B. Jessie Hilf
"Government speech" is as protean a concept as any m
constitutional law. 1 Justice Stevens's desc1iption of the term as
"recently minted" in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
notwithstanding, 2 govemment speech in fact has a relatively long
pedigree. 3 Yet that pedigree has not remained pure; instead, the
government speech concept has become entwined with multiple lines
of constitutional doctrine. 4
t Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Social Justice, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
I
In The Nfany Faces of Government Speech, for example, Professors Randall Bezanson
and William Buss identifY eight "typologies" of govemment speech. Randall P. Bezanson &
William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IoWA L. REv. 1377, 1384-87
(200 I). Much earlier, Professor Steven Shiffrin characterized government speech as including
"state support of communications ranging from official government messages, to statements by
public officials at publicly subsidized press conferences or in letters mailed at taxpayers'
expense, to the speech of political candidates and artists supported by government political or
artistic subsidies, to the publicly financed editorializing of broadcasters and public school
newspapers, to the communications of public school teachers, and even to the speech supported
by second class mail privileges that once operated as a generous subsidy to periodicals." Steven
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565,565 n.* (1980).
2 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
3 In his classic article on the subject, Shiffrin notes that Professor Mark Yudof had begun
exploring the topic in a 1977 lecture. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 569 n.l9. This exploration led
ultimately to Yudofs important book, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITJCS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSJON IN AMERICA (1983).
4
Though the concept of government speech primarily has relevance in the reahn of First
Amendment doctrine-including both free speech and the religion clauses-some recent
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Generalization is therefore difficult. But at a minimum, perhaps,
one can fairly state that "government speech" refers to a wide range
of phenomena in which, rather than regulating private speakers'
messages, the government controls or supports a particular message
using any of a panoply of cauots (such as funding or special access to
government property) or sticks (such as denial of funding or
exclusion from government property. The speech may originate with
the government itself or with a private individual, but the government
must control or support the message in some way. 5 As the array of
papers in this symposium demonstrates, government speech may
manifest itself in a variety of ways. It may include governmentsponsored religious displays, whether those displays were originally
designed by governmental actors or donated by private entities. 6 It
may include "platforms" for private speech, like monuments or
fellowship funding, where the government broadly approves but does
not micromanage the specific message conveyed. 7 It also includes
most of the things that public employees say in the course of their
employment. 8 Less obviously and more troublingly, it may include
every message conveyed-whether by state or private actors-at
government-sponsored public functions and in public school
curricular and extracurricular settings. 9 The argument might even be

commentary has extended government speech into other reahus, such as equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government
Speech, 59 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), m,aifable at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers
.cfm?abstract_id= 1760192.
5
See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571, 575 (2011) (arguing that "'effective control' over speech is the
primary distinguishiog factor in assigning responsibility for speech" as goverrunental or
private). Of course, the category of government-sponsored speech is not necessarily a clear-cut
or stable one. Professor Caroline Corbin has thus proposed a category of "mixed speech" for
speech that cannot clearly be characterized as governmental or private. Caroline Mala Corbin,
Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Govemmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607
(2008).
6 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132-34; Mary Jean Dolan, The Cross National
Memorial: At the Intersection of Speech and Religion, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1171 (2011);
Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations
and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1211 (2011).
7 See Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1253 (2011)
[hereinafter Greene, Speech Platforms].
8 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-43 (2006); see also Helen Norton,
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control ofIts Workers' Speech to Protect
its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. I, 30-40 (2009) (discussing the applicability of government
speech doctrine to public employees' speech).
9
Helen Norton, ImaginmJ' Threats to Government's Expressive Interests, 6l CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 1265 (2011).
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made that attomeys working in public law school clinics, in their
capacity as public employees, are engaging in government speech. 10
In most cases, the label of government speech has functioned as a
defense to an opposing claim of free speech rights. If the govemment
is trying to express its own message, the doctrine holds, then it has
leeway to exclude or discriminate against private messages in any
way it sees fit; the government, as speaker, is not subject to the same
constraints against content- and viewpoint-based discrimination as
when it acts as regulator of private speech. No government could do
its job, after all, if it had to provide a podium for opposing views
whenever it expressed its own views on matters like foreign policy or
public health According to a classic example, if the government erects
a Statue of Liberty, surely the First Amendment's prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination does not require it to permit construction of
a Statue of Autocracy as well. 11 The government may, and indeed
must, exercise dominion over its own message. Indeed, some amount
of govemment speech may in fact be desirable, as it enhances the
transparency of government actions and the reasons behind those
actions, thus leading to greater accountability for government actors. 12
Yet like all claims of dominion, the category of government
speech has a tendency to expand. Scholars have thus largely
responded with skepticism to the recent expansion of government
speech. 13 Professor Helen Norton's contribution to this symposium
demonstrates the dramatic expansion in the lower courts of the
Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 14 holding that
speech by government employees, even on matters of public concem,
was unprotected by the First Amendment when the speech was part of
the employee's official duties. 15 Courts have applied Garcetti's
government speech rationale in order to exclude dissenting speakers
from public functions and to punish legitimate and useful student
speech in public schools, although those cases are a far cry from
vindicating the doctrine's goal of furthering, rather than inhibiting,
public accountability. 16

IO See generally Margaret Tarkington, Govemment Speech and the Publicly Employed
Attomey, 2010 BYU L. REv. 2175 (briefly outlining and then refuting the argument).
II Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1 138.
12 Norton, supra note 8, at 20-23.
n Tills tone of skepticism is aptly demonstrated by the title of Professor Steven G. Gey 's
2010 article on the subject. Steven G. Gey, IJ17Jy Should the First Amendment Protect
Govemment Speech When the Govemment Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259 (2010).
14 547 u.s. 410 (2006).
15 Norton, supra note 9, at 1267-68.
16 Jd. at 1269-74.

1084

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

Similarly, in the case of law school clinics, Professor Peter Joy's
and Professor Adam Babich's articles describe striking examples of
the extent to which legislators seem willing to assert a right to control
clinic attorneys' and law students' speech in order to "de-lawyer"
indigent clients. 17 Indeed, in the case of Tulane Law School, the
legislature sought to control the speech of a private law school clinic,
which received minimal state funding, on the flimsy and specious
justification of protecting the state's economic interests. 18
Though the label of government speech may not be appropriate for
the activities of law school clinics, it nonetheless seems clear that the
First Amendment provides few safeguards against such interference.
Moreover, as Professor Jonathan Entin's article demonstrates,
governmental interference with speech aimed at law reform-and
especially with entities that sue the government or other powerful
interests-is nothing new. 19 New solutions and approaches are
therefore required. Professors Entin, Babich, and Joy heed this call in
a most valuable way, by considering what legal or other remedies
might in fact exist. In his thought-provoking essay, Professor Entin
suggests that the ideal of academic freedom, while largely lacking in
legal teeth, might nonetheless informally constrain both state and
non-state actors as a "powerful intellectual and social norm." 20
Professor Babich takes a highly original tack, explming the
possibility that the preemption doctrine might protect against delawyering strategies in the environmental law realm. 21 And Professor
Joy's thoughtful overview of legal responses to attacks on clinics
suggests that the equal protection doctrine, legal ethics regulations,
separation-of-powers doctrine, and even-in certain limited
circumstances-the right to free speech may provide some small
. 27
measure o f protectiOn. Moreover, for better or for worse, when the government speaks, it
mostly says what it thinks we want to hear. In other words,
government speech appears to gravitate toward expressing
majoritarian viewpoints. For Professor Abner Greene, this tendency is
not necessmily a bad thing. He argues in his excellent contribution to
17 Adam Babich, De-Lawyering Legislation and Environmental Lm11 Clinics: Can the
Preemption Doctrine Protect Public Participation Rights?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. ! !09
(20! I); Peter A. Joy, Govemment lnte1jerence with Lmv School Clinics and Access to Justice:
When Is There a Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1087 (20! 1).
IB Babich, supra note I 7, at I 116-23.
19 Jonathan L. Entin, Law School Clinics and the First Amendment, 61 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. ! !53 (201 I).
20 !d. at 1169.
21 Babich, supra note I 7.
n Joy, supra note I 7.
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this symposium that "[t]he state should ... have the power to refuse
to open platforms to speech that offends core, commonly held values
grounded in our commitment to the equal protection of the laws"such as hate speech or vnlgarity. 23 But state sponsorship of speech
platforms does not justify every sort of content-based judgment, even
in Professor Greene's view. The state should avoid taking sides with
respect to contested issues, for example, and it should not sponsor
speech that denigrates people on the basis of race or other illegitimate
traits. 24
When government speech is religious, however, its majoritarian
quality appears more troubling. As Professor Douglas Laycock's
contribution incisively demonstrates, many legal opinions upholding
the constitutionality of transparently religious monuments endorsing
Christianity engage in manipulation and recharacterization in order to
avoid acknowledging the obviously sectarian nature of the display? 5
Moreover, according to Professor Laycock, government's attempts to
distance itself from such speech should be rejected: it is usually a fair
assumption that the government agrees with the content of the sign it
erects, absent any clear indication to the contrary. 26 Taking these
displays at "face value," Professor Laycock argues, would lead to the
conclusion that "government display of a sacred text presumptively
endorses the religious message in that text, and the burden is on the
government to clearly rebut the presumption of endorsement with
[sufficiently clear] objective evidence. " 27
Similarly, Professor Mary Jean Dolan's original and illuminating
contribution considers how the recent expansion of government
speech doctrine to include what she refers to as "identity" messages
has led to greater collision with Establishment Clause principles. 28
Using the hypothetical case of a congressional choice to maintain the
National Memorial status of the Mojave desert cross challenged in
Salazar v. Buono 29 while refusing that status to proposed alternative
memorials, Professor Dolan highlights the point at which such
majoritmian religious speech becomes problematic-the point at
23 Greene, Speech Platjom1s, supra note 7, at 1257-58; cf Abner S. Greene, Government
of the Good, 53 V AND. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000) (arguing that "government in a liberal democracy not
only may promote contested views of the good, but should do so, as well," including by way of
its own speech).
24
Greene, Speech Platfonns, supra note 7, at 1258-59.
25 Laycock, Sllpra note 6.
26
ld. at 1252.
27 ld. at 1249; cf B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 539-44 (2005) (arguing for a
presumption against religious symbols on government property).
28 Dolan, supra note 6.
29 130 S. Ct. 1803 (20 10).
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which it becomes a "claim that the Christian symbol better represents
the national identity-or (and perhaps even worse) that is more
consistent with the image the government administration seeks to
present. "30
The multifaceted problem of government speech clearly provides
rich fodder for reflection, as the wide array of ariicles in this
fascinating and timely symposium demonstrates. The esteemed group
of panelists produced an exhilarating day of discussion as well as this
excellent and useful selection of papers. Much credit goes to them
and to the student editors of the Case Western Reserve Lavv Review,
together with their faculty advisor, Professor Jonathan Entin, for a
valuable addition to the burgeoning scholarship on government
speech. Indeed, the government speech doctrine, and the questions it
raises, will likely be with us for some time.

Jo

Dolan, supra note 6, at 1:210.

